Women's control over decision-making within their family, particularly regarding the use of household income, can play an important and long-lasting role in shaping their well-being and that of their children. Cash transfer programs often target women in order to increase their control over household resources. Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of this approach is mixed and suggests the importance of local context. We present evidence on the effect of cash transfers on women's control over decision-making in the MENA region, where little evidence is available and where cultural norms around women's roles differ from more-studied regions. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we identify the impact of Egypt's "Takaful" national cash transfer program on women's control over decision-making and labor supply. Receiving cash transfers mostly reduced women's reported ability to influence household decisions, particularly regarding child healthcare. The loss of control over decision-making was greater for women with less than primary education. Other effects of the program include a decline in women's employment and an increase in men's involvement in spheres of decision-making usually controlled by women. These results are robust to changes in model specification. We present suggestive evidence from mediation analysis that the negative effects on women's control over decision-making was directly related to these declines in employment and increase in men's involvement in female spheres. The negative findings are not wholly supported by complementary qualitative work in which women reported more positive perceptions of the program's impacts.
INTRODUCTION
Cash transfers targeted to the poor are a popular strategy for addressing poverty because the transfers directly raise incomes and also may reduce future poverty by enabling households to invest in financial assets and in child human capital, including their education, nutrition, and health (Bastagli et al. 2016; Handa et al. 2018; Hidrobo et al. 2018; Fiszbein and Schady 2009) . Less well understood is how cash transfers may change the dynamics of household decision-making and behavior in ways that reinforce or undermine their potential positive impacts on economic outcomes.
Cash transfer programs often target women as the recipients of cash payments with the intention of increasing women's control over household resources and, therefore, their relative decision-making power in the household (Behrman 2010) . There is broad empirical support for the benefits of increasing women's control over household resources. Bernard et al. (2018) and Doss (2013) show that the gender of the person who makes decisions in the household can have substantial impacts on real outcomes, including assets, human capital, production, and health. Empirical evidence has confirmed that women's control over resources can affect their decisionmaking power (Quisumbing & Maluccio 2003) . Additionally, there is evidence from a variety of contexts that women have a greater propensity than men to make spending decisions that favor investments in children, which result in improved outcomes for children in the future (Thomas 1990, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995; Quisumbing & Maluccio 2003; Duflo 2003; Sraboni and Quisumbing 2018; de Brauw et al. 2014) .
It is reasonable to expect that targeting cash transfers to women could increase women's control over household resources. Cash handed to the woman may be directly managed by them rather mingled with general household resources. In a non-cooperative model of the household (Lundberg and Pollack 1994) , having an external source of income may also improve women's decision-making power within the family. Providing cash transfers has also been found to reduce stress and improve the self-esteem of recipients (Haushofer and Shapiro 2016) . These changes may further lead to increased decision-making power for women as they feel more empowered to participate in decision-making.
There is mixed empirical evidence, however, on the impacts of cash transfers on measures of women's empowerment. Some literature has found positive effects. In Mexico, Attanasio and Lechene (2010) find that decision-making about spending on food shifted from decisions solely made by men to joint decisions between husbands and wives. Handa et al. (2009) find that a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program improved women's ability to make spending decisions regarding their own money (but not on how the money of other members of the household was spent). Buller et al. (2016) find that in Ecuador cash and food transfers reduced the prevalence of intimate partner violence and that this effect was driven in part by improvements in women's control over decision-making. Almås et al. (2018) show that in Macedonia, when mothers are randomly assigned to receive a cash transfer, measures of their empowerment improve. However, the literature has also found either null impacts of transfers or negative impacts on women's empowerment. De Brauw et al. (2014) find in Brazil that the Bolsa Familia program only improves women's empowerment in urban households and has either null or negative effects in rural households. Providing women with cash may increase conflict in a household through disagreements on how to spend the money or by men asserting themselves to be more included in decision-making on spending (Molyneaux & Thomson 2011; Das & Nanda 2016; Bradshaw & Viquez 2008) , particularly on large expenditures (Roy et al. 2015) . Impacts may also be different for decision-making than for other measures of empowerment. Bergolo and Galvan (2018) find that in Uruguay receiving cash transfers increased women's influence on decision-making while at the same time reducing women's labor supply. A recent review of cash transfer evaluations in Africa reported no impacts on women's empowerment in half of the studies and mixed effects, though mostly positive, in the other half (Peterman et al. 2019) . The same review showed that the effects of cash transfers on women's control over decision-making were also mixed, with only one quarter of studies finding positive effects. This mixed evidence suggests that context is important when studying the effects of cash transfers on women's decision-making power.
In this paper, we examine the impact of Egypt's national cash transfer program, the Takaful portion of the Takaful and Karama Program (TKP), on women's control over decision-making in the household. We exploit the program's approach to targeting, namely, a proxy means test (PMT) score with a cutoff that determines eligibility for the program, to estimate a regression discontinuity design to measure causal impacts of Takaful on women's reported decision-making in the household. We show a surprisingly robust negative impact on women's decision-making across multiple domains. We also find that the program causes small but significant decreases in women's labor market participation. We also find changes in the incidence of joint decision-making, with men becoming involved in traditionally female-dominated household decisions. Additionally, we show that the overall negative impacts are more pronounced among women with low levels of education. We present suggestive evidence on the inter-relationship between these various impacts on less educated women by using mediation analysis, though we are not able to identify a causal pathway.
Our analysis is enriched by insights from semi-structured qualitative interviews to shed light on the Egyptian context. These interviews offer insight on respondents' own language of valuation as brought forward through the interviews and discussions (Martinez-Alier 2008) . The qualitative work shows that, despite the negative impacts on decision-making within the household, women perceive the program, and specifically the targeting of the program to women, as empowering, as it positively affects their sense of agency and role as mothers and caregivers. This perspective is similar to that shared by women in other qualitative studies of cash transfer programs (Adato et al. 2010; Roy et al. 2015; Bonila et al. 2017) . The results of the quantitative analysis may differ from that of the qualitative analysis because, rather than structuring questions and responses in a specific way measuring a specific construct, the qualitative study seeks to capture a broader sense of respondents' views on a topic. This paper makes two important contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence on the impacts of cash transfers on women's control over decision-making and labor supply in an understudied context. Much of the empirical evidence on cash transfers and women's decisionmaking comes from Latin American countries and, increasingly, from sub-Saharan Africa or south Asia, but evidence is scant from Arab countries, where norms regarding gender may be very different. Indeed, we find that cultural norms play a large role in how we interpret the findings of the paper. Second, the paper provides evidence on women's education level as an important dimension of heterogeneity in the impact of cash transfers directed to women on decision-making within recipient households. The study also provides suggestive evidence about the mechanisms of the impact of the cash transfers on decision-making within households, as the loss in decisionmaking influence for women is shown to be co-occurring with a loss in outside employment and with men asserting a role in new domains of household decision-making.
This evaluation complements earlier descriptive research on the gender dimensions of cash transfers in Egypt based on a pilot program for the national CCT conducted in the Cairo slum of Ain El-Sira. A qualitative study concluded that the pilot program contributed to women's empowerment, but this was due primarily to the role of social workers who facilitated women's access to services and who were not part of the national level program (Sholkamy 2014) . Similarly, using two rounds of observational panel data on participating households in the pilot program, Zaki (2014) found an increase in the share of beneficiary women in reporting decision-making ability within their households, including in decisions made outside the home and in women's labor force participation, although women became less likely to be able to make decisions on large expenditures. However, it is not possible to conclude from this study that these effects were due to the pilot transfer program. This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the Takaful cash transfer program in Egypt. In section 3, we present the data and methodology used in the analysis. In section 4, we present the results. Section 5 provides a discussion of qualitative findings, and section 6 concludes.
THE TAKAFUL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAM
The Takaful and Karama Program, Egypt's newest national cash transfer program, is managed by the Ministry of Social Solidarity and was introduced in March 2015. "Takaful" (Solidarity) is targeted to poor households with children under age 18. 1 The transfer amount of Takaful depends on the number of children and their schooling level. Households can register up to three children. "Karama" (Dignity) is a much smaller partner program of transfers targeted to disabled, elderly, and orphaned individuals. Takaful is the largest of the two programs, accounting for 87 percent of all beneficiaries. In June 2017, at the time of sample selection, there were 2.84 million households in the registry used to screen applicants for the two programs, and 1.67 million of these were beneficiaries of Takaful. Our analysis focuses on the effect of the Takaful household transfers on decision-making between partners in dual-headed households.
TKP is targeted towards poor households using a combination of geographic targeting, selfselection, and a proxy means test (PMT). The program was rolled out in several waves, starting with the poorest districts in Egypt. Consequently, recipients are disproportionately from rural areas in the southern region of Upper Egypt, the poorest part of the country. Once the program was activated in a district, households applied at local offices of the Ministry of Social Solidarity by filling out a form with detailed household characteristics, which was then sent to the central office. At the central office, some of the data from this form, such as employment status and land ownership, were verified from administrative databases. Thereafter, a household PMT score was calculated to determine whether the household met the TKP eligibility cut-off. Approximately half of the applicants at the time of sample selection had been accepted as program beneficiaries. The use of a defined cut-off in eligibility by PMT score will be key to our identification strategy. We have verified through administrative data that the cut-off was rigorously applied. 2 Takaful defines the main beneficiary as the mother or caregiver of the eligible children in the household. Men are only listed as the main beneficiary in rare cases if there is no adult female caregiver in the household. (In our sample, in only 5 percent of households were transfers made directly to men.) The cash transfer is delivered via smart card at post offices, automated teller 1 Takaful is designed to be a conditional cash transfer program with transfers linked to school attendance targets and health clinic visits by preschoolers. However, at the time of conducting the quantitative survey and the qualitative data collection, the conditionalities were not yet implemented. 2 The eligibility cut-off was adjusted slightly over the course of registration, as described in Section 3. Seven percent of beneficiary households were included in the program despite having scores above the current cut-off. On the other hand, 12 percent of nonbeneficiary households were excluded despite having scores below the currently applied cut-off. There were more non-beneficiaries above the cut-off than vice versa because additional exclusion factors were applied -including ownership of a car, owning more than 1.0 feddan of land, and receiving remittances from outside of Egypt -to exclude households that would otherwise be eligible based on their PMT score alone. machines, and Social Units. The cash can only be collected by the designated beneficiary who may need to show their national ID, to ensure that the funds reach the hands of female beneficiaries almost exclusively. One of the TKP designers described this choice to give the transfers to women as a way to uplift women in their role as caregivers (H. Sholkamy, personal communication, 4 Dec. 2017 ). The World Bank project document for TKP also states that giving the transfers to mothers was intended "to provide economic empowerment of participating women and increase their participation in family decision-making." (World Bank 2015) .
At the time of data collection, Takaful transfers consisted of a base payment of EGP 325 per household, plus EGP 60 for each primary-school aged child, EGP 80 for each preparatory-school aged, and EGP 100 for each secondary school aged child. 3 The average total household transfer from Takaful was equivalent to 17 percent of beneficiary household expenditure, a substantial contribution to the household budget. An impact evaluation report of the effect of the TKP cash transfers on household consumption showed that TKP beneficiary households spent significantly more on food than did non-beneficiary households, particularly high value and nutrient-dense foods, such as fruit and meat/poultry (Breisinger et al. 2018; ElDidi et al. 2018 ).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Data collection
Household survey
The data used for the analysis come from a household survey of 6,003 Takaful applicant households in 400 communities (villages or village sized units defined by the administrative data for urban areas) conducted in August 2017 as part of an impact evaluation of TKP. After excluding female headed households and households in which the head of household was not the husband of the Takaful beneficiary, the sample size used for the analysis here consists of 5,611 households. The survey included household-level questions on demographics, employment, education, assets, consumption, health, participation in cash transfer and other government transfer programs, and anthropometry. The households in our sample are geographically representative of all TKP applicants with PMT scores within 600 points of the main Takaful eligibility threshold of 4500 (corresponding to roughly the middle two quartiles of the full distribution of registrants) and were selected using stratified cluster random sampling. Stratification was based primarily on region: Metropolitan (greater Cairo and Alexandria), Upper Rural, Upper Urban, Lower Rural, and Lower Urban, as the PMT formula used differed slightly by region. In the Upper Rural region of Egypt where the majority of TKP registrants are located, we also stratified by governorate for a total of 14 region-governorate strata. Communities were selected using simple random sampling proportional to the number of registrants in each stratum.
Because we sampled from households near the eligibility cut-off, the households in our sample are slightly better off than the average beneficiary, so the transfers were only equivalent to 13 percent of household expenditure for households in our sample, compared to 17 percent for the nationally representative sample. However, this is the relevant sample for causal identification using a regression discontinuity design.
Women's decision-making and employment variables
Two modules in this survey were specifically directed to the female Takaful beneficiary in the household. The enumerator was instructed to interview the female beneficiary alone if possible (84 percent of respondents) or to record the presence of other household members -adult males were present in 6 percent of cases, while in other cases adult females or children were present. 4 The decision-making module asks about the woman's influence on household decision-making in the following nine domains:
1. participation in wage employment; 2. major household expenditures, such as house repairs or buying a large consumer durable; 3. minor household expenditures, such as food for daily consumption or other household needs; 4. use of government subsidies or cash transfers; 5. what food should be cooked every day; 6. obtaining medical treatment for yourself; 7. buying clothes for yourself; 8. taking children to the doctor; and 9. dealing with children's school and teachers or sending children to school on a daily basis.
The full text of these survey questions is included for reference in Appendix 1. For each decision category, we asked the woman about who in the household makes decisions on this topic. The woman was then asked about her ability to influence decisions, as follows: "If the subject is very important, to what extent do you feel you can make your own personal decisions regarding these aspects of household life if you wanted to?" Responses were scored on a scale of 1-4, corresponding to "not at all" (1), "a small extent" (2), "a medium extent" (3), or "to a great extent" (4).
Our outcome variable for women's control over decision-making is constructed using principal components analysis (PCA) to aggregate the responses on women's influence on decision-making across the nine domains. Because the decision-making data are ordinal values, we use a polychoric correlation matrix for the PCA as recommended by Kolenikov and Angeles (2004) . We use the first principal component of this PCA as the main outcome variable. We also use another three alternative approaches to the aggregation across domains as robustness checks. For the second approach to defining the outcome variable, we simply calculate the mean score response to the questions on the nine different domains. For the third approach, we use the first principal component from a PCA of the binary indicator in each of the nine domains for whether or not a woman answered that she could influence decisions "to a great extent". For the fourth approach, we do the opposite, constructing a PCA index based on a binary indicator for whether the response was "not at all." All outcome variables are normalized so our results are reported in standard deviations. Larger values of the PCA index for the first three approaches represent greater influence of women, while in the fourth approach, larger values represent lower influence of women.
Another survey module directed to the female beneficiary asked a standard series of questions for measuring self-efficacy (Chen, Gully, and Eden 2001) . See the first section of Appendix 1. We create a similar PCA-based index from the responses to this set of questions.
We also construct variables for the involvement of the male household head in decision-making based on the response to the first question asked for each domain "who makes decisions about [this domain]". These questions had various possible response choices describing different combinations of household members : the head of the household; the spouse of the head of the household; the head and spouse jointly; adult children; the household head and adult children; the spouse and adult children; the head and a parent; the head and brothers; or other. We define an indicator for involvement of the head as equal to one if the respondent selected one of the choices including the household head and zero otherwise.
Finally, we use employment data from the survey module on wage employment. We define three employment outcomes for the main female respondent: ever worked for pay, currently participate in paid work in the agricultural sector, and paid work in other sectors. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of women in our sample of Takaful applicants. We show summary statistics for the decision-making variables separately for mothers with less than primary education (35 percent of the sample) and women with at least primary education (65 percent of the sample). Within Egyptian society more broadly, a woman's education level is positively correlated with greater decision-making influence (Assaad et al. 2014 ). This motivates our interest in examining heterogeneity by education level. About 28 percent of household heads in our quantitative sample reported less than primary education compared to 35 percent of women. Source: Authors' analysis. Note: Responses to the questions on the degree to which women can influence decisions were scored on a scale of 1 to 4, corresponding to "not at all" (1), "a small extent" (2), "a medium extent" (3), or "to a great extent" (4) . Asterisks in rightmost column show results of a t-test of the significance of differences in the characteristic between women with at least primary education and those with less than primary education. * p < 0.1, ** p < .05, *** p < 0.01.
Summary statistics
As seen in Table 1 , women with less than primary education are on average several years older and less likely to live in urban areas compared to women with at least primary education. The average woman has between two and three children and households are almost universally monogamous. Paid employment is rare for women in our sample. Takaful registrants are disproportionately rural and located in Upper Egypt, a region with more conservative gender norms, due to the program's geographic targeting. The women are drawn from the poorest households, so it is unsurprising that the female rate of paid work in our sample is far lower than the most recent estimates for Egypt as a whole of 10.6 percent for women aged 15 to 64 years (Hendy 2015) . Only 2.5 percent of women in our sample reported paid work. Women with less than primary education were slightly more likely to report paid work, in particular, paid work in agriculture.
The average degree of influence over decision-making reported by women for the whole sample is just under 3 on a scale from 1 to 4, which corresponds to a "medium extent of influence." The domains with the lowest reported influence for women are participating in wage employment and spending on major household expenditures, while the categories with the highest reported influence are spending on minor household expenditures and deciding what food should be cooked. Women with less than primary education have a lower degree of influence over household decisions on major expenditures, but reported similar influence on other categories of decisions compared to women with at least primary education. Looking at the aggregate indexes, there is no significant difference in the PCA-based indices or in the simple average decision-making score for women with primary education compared to women with less than primary education. However, women with less than primary education are slightly worse when we use the PCA-based index that used the "not at all" responses.
Qualitative data collection
To provide a better sense of context for Egypt, semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions were conducted following the quantitative data collection to provide additional information on the perceptions of women's role in household decision-making and how this had been affected by the Takaful transfers. Six communities were selected from among those included in the quantitative data collection: two rural and one urban community in Upper Egypt and another similar set in Lower Egypt, following the principal of maximum diversity sampling (Patton 1990, 172; Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014) . Households were selected by income level and beneficiary status so as to include two ultra-poor beneficiary households, one beneficiary household near the threshold, two ultra-poor non-beneficiary households, and one non-beneficiary household below the threshold from each community. Consequently, our sample for the qualitative data collection included proportionally poorer households because it was structured to capture impressions of the program from the broadest possible range of households and oversampled from among the poorest households that had not been included in the quantitative evaluation since they were far from the cut-off according to the PMT score.
In each household, the man and the woman were interviewed by researchers of the same gender as the interviewee. The female respondents were the same Takaful beneficiaries or nonbeneficiaries that had answered the quantitative survey questions -that is, mothers or female caregivers of children under age 18. Where possible, the man interviewed in the household was the female respondent's husband. This was especially important in beneficiary households. However, in eight cases of the husband being unavailable (due to travel for work, the wife being widowed, or a single case where the husband refused to be interviewed), other male relatives also living in the household (the wife's father in-law, for example) were interviewed instead. Both men and women were asked about decision-making roles, perceptions about the program and transfers going to women, and how the households managed the transfer income. All female respondents were additionally asked about general household budgeting. Interviews were conducted with 61 individuals across 34 households.
Additional data was collected in each community through two focus group discussions with beneficiaries -one for men and one for women. Topics covered in these discussions included impressions about the program, including perceptions on women's decision-making; effects on wellbeing of friends and neighbors in the community; effects on relationships between men and women in the household; and opinions on the transfers going to women. Community profile interviews were also carried out with key respondents in the community, such as local leaders, community social workers, or community elders, to further understand the local context in each community.
Analysis
Identification strategy
The identification strategy is based on a regression discontinuity approach, which compares households just below a threshold with those just above a threshold. This approach results in the two samples being very similar to one another in terms of many characteristics. In this case, we have used households from the registration data base that are just above and below the eligibility cutoff in the Proxy Means Test (PMT) used for selecting beneficiaries.
We identify the causal impact of the Takaful program on registrant households by using an instrumental variable (IV) regression using an indicator for whether the household's PMT score is below the cut-off as an instrument for current program beneficiary status, following the approach of Angrist and Lavy (1999) . The eligibility threshold was changed twice, corresponding to three waves of registration for the program. In some cases, the revised thresholds were not consistently applied retroactively, so the household PMT score needs to be compared to the specific threshold used to determine eligibility of that household at or after the time the household registered. This approach is analogous to a fuzzy regression discontinuity regression, but with multiple thresholds applied over time.
The first stage estimating equation is:
The second stage estimating equation is:
The dependent variable P in the first stage equation (1) is an indicator for whether the household was a beneficiary of the program in June 2017. E is a vector of six binary eligibility indictors. We also include a linear trend of the running variable (Score), which is the initial PMT score that the household was assigned. are strata dummy variables that account for the nature of the stratified sampling of the data and are included in both the first and second stages. The dependent variable in the second stage equation (2) is our outcome variable for women's influence on household decision-making. Observations are indexed by household (i) , community (c), and strata (s). Standard errors are clustered at the community level. We define six binary variables corresponding to household eligibility during the three waves of registration as well as changes in eligibility between waves. We use these eligibility variables to predict the likelihood that a household was accepted into the program conditional on applying. As described in the eligibility threshold summary table (Table 2) , the threshold PMT score was originally set at 5,003, it then dropped to 4,296 (making the program more restrictive); then increased up to 4,500 (allowing more households to qualify again). Finally, a higher threshold of 6,500 was applied only for female-headed households. Households were accepted into the program if they met the current eligibility threshold at the time when they applied. They were also supposed to be added to or removed from the program as their eligibility status changed when the thresholds moved. However, because this updating was not applied consistently, household eligibility at the time of application and at any time since application remains a significant predictor of current beneficiary status even after controlling for eligibility based on the current threshold. The six binary variables that capture households' eligibility at or at different points in time after they applied to the program are defined in Table 2 .
The results of the first stage regressions are shown in Table 3 . All of the individual eligibility indicator variables are significant predictors of beneficiary status in at least one of the relevant samples. The regression has a high overall F-statistic and R 2 . In the second stage, the predicted participation from this regression is used as the independent variable, allowing us to infer causality as the predicted participation is exogenous. The instruments are the binary eligibility indicators based on whether household PMT score was below the Takaful threshold. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
We will present results estimated using equations (1) and (2) on the outcome variable for women's decision making (our main outcome variable and the three alternative approaches) and will compare the sample of women with less than primary education with the sample of women with at least primary education. We will also present robustness checks and the impacts of the program estimated similarly on the self-efficacy, women's labor supply, and the incidence of joint decisionmaking.
Mediation analysis
To understand more about why the program caused a decline in women's influence over household decision-making, we use mediation analysis to investigate whether other observable indicators are involved in the pathway between the program treatment and our outcome variable. Showing that specific variables act as mediators on a causal pathway -meaning that the treatment works by first impacting the mediator and then the mediator impacts the final outcome -requires strong assumptions, which do not necessarily hold in this study. However, without making any claim about the direction of causality, we use the mediation analysis approach to show that some variables (mediators) are significantly correlated with the treatment's effects on our main outcome variable.
We follow the Baron and Kenny (1986) sequence of steps for defining both paid employment and men's role in decision-making domains as mediation variables for our main outcome variable of women's influence on household decisions, as measured by the PCA-based index, by comparing coefficients on the treatment variable of Takaful participation between equations (3) and (4) below:
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The decline in the coefficient on the treatment variable (Takaful participation) when we add the mediator indicates the role of the mediator in influencing the outcome variable of women's decision-making. The indirect effect, the degree to which the final outcome variable is mediated by the mediator, is given by the product of the coefficients (indirect effect= ) following the advice of McKinnon et al. (2011) . Following Preacher and Hayes (2008) , we use seemingly unrelated regressions to estimate equations (4) and (5) and bootstrap the standard errors (with 1,000 replications) for the product of the coefficients to test the null hypothesis that the indirect effect is greater than zero.
Qualitative analysis
The qualitative data was informally analyzed for major patterns without detailed coding. This was done by the authors and collaborators involved in the qualitative field work through careful re-reading of the transcripts and sorting quotations around common themes.
RESULTS
Program impacts on household decision-making
Despite the Takaful program being designed to increase women's control of resources, we find negative and statistically significant program impacts on our index measure of women's control over household decision-making. These impacts are concentrated in the subsample of women with less than primary education.
In Table 4 , we show the results of the IV estimation. For our main outcome variable in column (1), the women's empowerment index, we find a significant (at the 5 percent level) negative impact of 0.14 standard deviations across all women in the sample. When we split the sample by education level, this negative impact is larger in magnitude: -0.35 standard deviations and significant at the 1 percent level for women with less than primary education, but insignificant and close to zero for women with at least primary education. The difference in the impact between women with and without primary education is statistically significant (p-value of 0.042).
In column (2) we report the results for our second specification of the outcome variable: the mean score (across the Likert scale of 1-4) of the nine domains, again reported in standard deviations. As with column (1), there is a negative and statistically significant impact for all women (0.1 standard deviations), it is larger in magnitude for women who have less than primary education (0.23 standard deviations), and the difference in coefficients is statistically significant (p-value 0.041).
The third and fourth outcome variables, standardized PCA-based indices for indicator variables where the response is "to a great extent" and "not at all", respectively, also show decision-making being adversely impacted by being a Takaful beneficiary and the coefficient for being able to make decisions "to a great extent" is statistically significant. However, we cannot reject the null that the differences between the more and less educated groups of women are statistically significant in both columns (3) and (4). However, these last two measures do not use all available information and thus are not the preferred outcomes, but rather are presented as robustness checks. We conclude that the Takaful program reduced women's decision-making power and did so more for women with lower levels of education. For the remainder of the analysis, we concentrate on our main outcome variable: the PCA index calculated using the full set of ordinal data. (1), "a small extent" (2), "a medium extent" (3), or "to a great extent" (4).
It is possible that the larger negative impact on women's decision-making power for women with less than primary education actually reflects the difference in education levels between men and women. When men have greater education than their wives, we can imagine that they would have greater decision-making power than if both spouses had the same level of education. As a robustness check, we split the sample by whether the husband has more education than the wife rather than simply using the level of education of the woman. Results are reported in Table 5 . We see a qualitatively similar story, with the negative impact being larger in magnitude in households where the husband's education is greater than the wife's education for all four outcome variables. The difference in coefficients, however, is smaller and not statistically significant for any of the outcome variables. This suggests that it is the low education level of women itself that is the important characteristic rather than the difference in education levels between men and women. (1), "a small extent" (2), "a medium extent" (3), or "to a great extent" (4).
The overall negative impact was not driven solely by a single category related to controlling household assets, such as has been found in other evaluations of cash transfer programs. Rather, there were negative impacts across almost all nine categories of decision-making. In all cases where there are negative impacts, they are larger for women with less than primary education. Table 6 shows the impact of the Takaful transfers on women's influence by each of the nine decision categories. 5 Outcome variables are reported levels of influence: 4= "a great extent"; 3= "a medium extent"; 2= "a small extent"; 1= "not at all". Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Note: Responses on the question on the degree to which women can influence decisions were scored on a scale of 1-4, corresponding to "not at all" (1), "a small extent" (2), "a medium extent" (3), or "to a great extent" (4) .
For the full sample of women (the top panel in Table 6 ), the statistically significant negative impacts are limited to three decision-making categories: participating in wage employment, taking a child to the doctor, and dealing with a child's school and teachers. For women with less than primary education, even the domains of decision-making for getting medical treatment for herself and buying clothes for herself as well as minor household expenditures were also negatively impacted, and the estimates are statistically significant. Notably, decisions regarding the use of government transfers are negatively impacted by the program for women with less than primary education, suggesting the possibility that decisions cannot be made by the recipient even for the money transferred to them by Takaful.
Estimates for women with at least primary education failed to reject the null hypothesis of no effect for all nine domains. 6 We are also not able to reject the null hypothesis that coefficients are statistically different between women with at least primary education and women with less than primary education, except in three decision-making domains: minor household expenditures, using government subsidies, and what food should be cooked. From these results we conclude that the overall negative impacts on women's decision-making are not limited to any particular domain but are indicative of decision-making over several domains.
The significant and negative program impacts on female decision-making contrasts with a lack of impact on the measure of self-efficacy (Table 7 ). There are no statistically significant impacts for the full sample of women, the sample of women with less than primary education, or the sample of women with at least primary education. Additionally, there are no statistically significant differences between the two groups of women. This clarifies that the program did not broadly cause declines in women's agency, but only specifically within the context of intrahousehold decision-making. 
Wald test for equality of coefficients for less than primary education versus at least primary education
Program impacts on female employment
In addition to the negative impact on women's decision-making, we also find a significant negative impact of receiving the Takaful cash transfers on women's involvement in paid employment in the past year. Again, the magnitude of the coefficient is larger for women with less than primary education. Results are reported in Table 8 , column (1) . We also separate working in the agricultural sector and the non-agricultural sector, as work for women in the agricultural sector is mostly seasonal or temporary and has much lower pay than in the non-agricultural sector. 6 It might seem possible that some of the negative impacts on being able to make decisions about children were related to women feeling that planned program conditionality on child school attendance and health diminished their autonomy. However, only 2.5 percent of women in the sample reported being aware of conditionalities related to education and only a single woman in the sample of 5,629 mentioned any conditionality related to healthcare, so there is no potential for the planned program conditionality driving these results.
Looking at the probability that any women in the household were engaged in paid work outside of the agricultural sector in the past 12 months, Table 8 shows that the Takaful transfers caused a decrease of 2 percentage points among all women and 5 percentage points among women with less than primary education (column 2). These effects are significant at the 5 percent level for less educated women. Estimates for women with at least primary education are not significant. Notably, the decline in employment among less educated women is due to lower probability of employment in the non-agricultural sector. The coefficients for impacts on employment are only marginally statistically distinguishable between more and less educated women (p=0.107). 
Program impacts on men's involvement in household decisions
If women's influence on household decision-making declines, we may see men making decisions instead of women, or we may see that the incidence of joint decision-making changes. We report results on whether the male head of the household is involved in decision-making in a particular domain out of the nine domains considered. The dependent variable in these regressions is a binary variable indicating that the woman mentioned the head of household in response to the question about who in the family primarily makes decisions in the particular domain. It was common for various combinations of family members, rather than single individuals, to be reported as involved in decisions. Table 9 shows that specifically among women with less than primary education, receiving the Takaful transfers increased the probability that men play a role in decisions, even those decisions that are traditionally within the female sphere, such as deciding about what food to cook. For the subsample of women with less than primary education there are large and statistically significant impacts of Takaful on the probability of the household head being involved in decisions about spending government subsidies and transfers, what food should be cooked, and a woman buying clothes for herself. Estimates for women with at least primary education failed to reject the null hypothesis of no effect for all nine decision-making domains. While these categories do not line up precisely with categories in which there were negative impacts on women's decisionmaking influence, there is considerable overlap in practical terms between deciding on minor household expenditures and deciding on what food to cook or what clothes to buy. In the domains of what food should be cooked and purchasing clothing for herself, there are no significant impacts where women have at least primary education, and the coefficients in the two groups of women are statistically different. These results show that this impact of the Takaful program also occurred primarily for less educated women.
The largest program impact on men's involvement in household decision-making for households in which the woman had less than primary education is in the category of deciding how to use government subsidies or transfers. While very few households in the sample received transfers other than Takaful, 85 percent participated in the food subsidy program through which households receive a bundle of subsidized food items (e.g., bread, sugar, oil) or the cash equivalent of their non-consumed bread that they can spend on subsidized products. The impact we see on this category, therefore, is a switch from everyday food spending decisions that are managed by women in households without Takaful transfers to men becoming involved once the amount is larger and the transfer can potentially be used for purchases of a range of products, rather than only for food.
Note that it is not clear from Tables 6 and 9 alone that the increase in men's involvement in decision-making is linked to the decrease women's control over decision-making. Decision-making is not necessarily zero-sum and the questions about who in the household is involved in the decision and how much influence the wife has on important decisions were asked separately in the survey. Joint decision-making is common, and women mostly also stay involved in the decisions. It is possible for men to become involved in decisions while women continue have a say in the final decision. If women's reported influence had not decreased, there would be nothing problematic about men increasingly caring about women's spheres of decision-making. We show, however, in the next section, that there is evidence that men's increased involvement in decision-making was linked to decreases in women's ability to influence important decisions.
Correlational mediation analysis of the impact results
Without suggesting that we are able to identify a causal pathway, we use mediation analysis to investigate whether there is a relationship between the impacts explored individually above. While, as noted, it is not necessarily the case that men becoming involved in a particular decision-making domain would decrease women's control of decisions in that domain, it does intuitively make sense in a context where men are normatively described as the one who should make household decisions. Women's reduced probability of having paid work can also be hypothesized to lead to lower influence on household decisions. Both literature on intra-household bargaining and empirical evidence from other contexts show that work outside the household increases women's decision-making by improving their outside options and, thereby, their bargaining power (McElroy 1990 (McElroy , 1997 Anderson and Eswaran 2009; Antman 2014 ).
Since we cannot exclude the intervening influence of other factors, we explicitly limit our analytical claim here to showing whether decreases in female employment, male expansion into traditionally female decision spheres, and decreases in female influence in decision-making about spending are jointly occurring. The intuition behind this interpretation of using mediation analysis to show links between impact results is grounded in the idea that mediation can be expressed in terms of the potential outcomes for underlying principal strata, as in Rubin (2004). 7 For the subsample of women with less than primary education, Table 10 shows the results from adding the hypothesized mediators individually and jointly to the instrumental variables regression for program impact with the same specification otherwise as in equations (1) and (2) . Controlling for changes in paid work as well as changes in men's roles in decision-making markedly decreases the statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient on the treatment variable. This suggests that the mediators of the woman working for pay in the past year and the head of household being involved in decisions on spending government benefits, what to cook, and what clothes the woman buys are part of the pathway for impacts of Takaful on women's decisionmaking. Table 11 reports the estimates of the indirect effect of each of the proposed mediators individually and collectively for the subsample of women with less than primary education. The reported coefficient is the product αβ of the coefficients from equations (4) and (5) representing the impact of the program on the mediator and the correlation between the mediator and women's decision-making. We use bootstrapped standard errors to test whether these indirect effects are significantly different from zero. In all cases, the mediator had a significant negative indirect effect on women's decision-making for less educated women. The total indirect effect from these mediators is -0.202 standard deviations, representing a large share of the negative program impact of -0.348 standard deviations (Table 4 ). Again, we are explicit that the indirect effect estimated is not interpretable as a causal mediation effect due to violations of the sequential ignorability assumption that the potential impacts of the cash transfer on women's decision-making are independent of potential impacts of the cash transfer on women's work or men's role in decision-making. Household characteristics, such as the degree of cooperation between the spouses, how much time the husband spends at home, the woman's assertiveness, the degree of stress about household finances, the in-law's involvement, and the like, can be expected to influence both of these sets of outcomes. The benefit of the mediation analysis is to show that these sets of impacts are co-occurring. This does not provide a definitive model of how households react to receiving the cash transfers, but it allows us to invalidate explanations in which the decrease in female employment or increase in head involvement in decision-making are held to be unrelated to the decrease in women's decisionmaking.
DISCUSSION
Our quantitative analysis shows a negative impact from the program on women's decision-making, particularly for women with low levels of education. The program also caused women to be less likely to participate in the labor market and men to be more involved in traditionally femaledominated household decisions. In the discussion below, we examine how findings from the qualitative data complement these results.
Within the cultural context in Egypt, the need for consultation and the recognition of men's important role in decision-making is accepted as normal and may even have been overstated to show compliance with cultural norms. So, the average levels of decision-making influence we report may understate women's true influence in the household.
This cultural norm was made apparent by respondents in the qualitative interviews and focus groups, "I consult him on anything" said one beneficiary woman in Assiut. "That's our culture here. Women have to take their husbands' opinions in anything, even if it's small." A non-beneficiary woman in Cairo also illustrated this cultural conformity by explaining, "If I want something expensive, I tell him. And he says. 'Fine, get what you want.' But I have to tell him. He won't disapprove, but the man has to keep his figure in the house and in front of his kids. I need to give him his 'prestige' in front of his kids. I'm the one who gives them their pocket money, but I tell them it's your dad who got the money."
Additionally, women demonstrated that when financial resources are constrained, for example, they also know not to ask for what they determine are unreasonable things so as not to pressure their husbands. "I tell him what we need, and if he has money, he gives it to me to get what I asked for. If not, then that's it. If he doesn't have the money I don't insist, because there's nothing in his hands, so I can't push him too much" described a beneficiary woman in a rural village in the Upper Egypt governorate of Assiut.
Impacts of the transfer on intrahousehold decision-making
Our qualitative analysis did not find that women perceived negative impacts from the cash transfers on household relationships or their influence on intrahousehold decision-making patterns, as suggested by the quantitative analysis.
In response to a question about the program's choice to give the transfers to women, both women and men had mostly favorable or indifferent views. Most interview respondents felt that the transfers reduced stress over household spending and, thus, improved household relationships. There were only rare second-hand reports of conflict associated with the transfers. A few women in the qualitative sample reported exclusive control (without having to consult their husbands) or joint control over spending transfer income, while reporting that they were less involved in general household spending decisions. This provides suggestive evidence that the program may have been effective in increasing women's control of household resources in some cases. Meanwhile, most women reported similar decision-making for spending across general household income and transfer income.
Several dynamics may be reflected by respondents not reporting a negative impact of Takaful on decision-making in the interviews and focus-group discussions, such as that seen in the quantitative analysis. First, it can reflect differences in sample populations. The quantitative sample reflects the program's geographic distribution of beneficiaries, where the majority are from rural Upper Egypt, while the qualitative sample was designed with an equal number of respondents from Upper and Lower Egypt, and from urban and rural areas.
Secondly, the qualitative and quantitative approaches to looking at the impact of the transfers differed. The quantitative approach of structured questions about decision-making across domains using a Likert scale with causal identification using an IV methodology may be more able to capture subtle differences between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In the qualitative interviews and focus groups, women may have been responding to the Takaful transfers' positive effect on the well-being of their households and on stress levels within the household, as the transfers reduced stress caused by a lack of the income needed for household expenses. These benefits of the program may have eclipsed the effects of the program on intrahousehold decision-making in the qualitative interviews. This is consistent with the quantitative analysis' finding of negative impacts only on intrahousehold decision-making and not on women's self-efficacy.
Finally, qualitative respondents may not have easily been able to perceive how transfers influenced decision-making, because decisions on spending were often made prior to receiving the transfer cash. Many households reported that most, if not all, of the amount received from the transfers has already been committed to paying off installments or debt repayment by the time it is received. For example, the husband of a female beneficiary in Menoufia explained, "In general, my wife would keep the money. But anyway, we don't store the money because it's spent within an hour or even minutes. We pay the installment for the oven and pay back the money we owe to the grocery store and the pharmacy, and, if there's anything left, we'll buy food, but that normally doesn't happen." This difficulty in perceiving links between the transfers and decision-making may also explain why the qualitative survey did not find reports supporting the quantitative finding of a negative impact.
Women's employment
The qualitative data support the idea that receiving the Takaful transfers could have decreased female employment due to an income effect in a context where women only work outside the home if absolutely necessary.
Regional gender norms regarding female employment differ, but most Takaful applicants are from rural Upper Egypt where women working outside the house is not widely accepted. Researchers concur on this strong normative preference in that context, particularly among men (Hoodfar 1997; Najjar, Frija and El Garhi 2018; Salem et al. 2015) . This was confirmed in our own qualitative data collection. For example, a Takaful beneficiary husband in rural Suhag (Upper Egypt) stated, "We only have my work, because I'll never let my wife work and get this responsibility on her shoulders. Besides that, it is not allowed for the women in our community to deal with other men."
The program's income effect may have decreased the economic pressure that had caused women to work outside the home. Women may also have a preference to stop working, since female employment is concentrated in the informal sector, dominated by low-paid jobs and poor work environments (UNDP and Ministry of Economic Development 2010).
Men's involvement in decision-making
The mediation analysis showed that Takaful's impact on men's higher involvement in household decision-making is correlated with a decrease in women's decision-making and is not simply a benign increase in cooperation. Men may have become more concerned about household spending decisions since the qualitative analysis showed that acceptance of the transfer going to women was linked with a strong expectation that the transfers would be spent on household and children's needs. This is supported by the finding that men became more involved in decisions on how to spend government transfers, and women with less than primary education reported a lower ability to make decisions in this sphere.
The qualitative data also helps enrich this story as the qualitative interviewers spoke to both men and women in the same household and asked specifically about how the transfer money was managed. No men said that they themselves took decisions on spending the transfer alone. However, many men did consider the transfers to be a joint resource to be negotiated, rather than a resource that should be primary controlled by women. Men, more often than women, described decision-making about using the Takaful transfers as joint, even in households where the woman said that she primarily managed the transfer spending alone.
During the semi-structured interviews, most respondents said that the transfer had either no impact or a positive impact on husband and wife relationships. Yet many draw the line at women spending the transfer money on themselves rather than their children or household needs. For example, a mother in-law sitting in on an interview in Fayoum intervened to express that "When the wife is good and spends on the house, it will not matter to the man that she has money in her hands." In Menoufia, while a beneficiary man saw no effects from targeting women on his own relationship with his wife, he pointed to issues for a minority of families which he attributed "to the woman not wanting to share the money." This association between transfer money and spending on the family may be based on the program's communication that transfers are to support the family's livelihood and children's welfare.
Broader perceptions of the transfer impacts
While decision-making indicators are important for comparability purposes, it is also important to consider women's own understanding, valuation, and contextual conception of their own decisionmaking abilities and empowerment. This may differ from pre-determined indicators or externally structured definitions, as highlighted by Meinzen-Dick et al. (2019) . For example, in responding to the semi-structured interview questions intended to elicit self-conceptions of their level of empowerment and control over decision-making, some women responded with explanations of how tight their overall household budget was, while others responded by referring to their education, their health, and their opportunities or lack of opportunities to support their households through income-generating activities. This applies to both Takaful beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries. In their valuation of the Takaful program, women often emphasized the positive benefits of the additional cash to their households. Some also considered the Takaful transfers to have extended to them a form of public recognition of their roles as mothers and household managers. As one woman commented, "It's good this way (that the transfers are going to women) […] the State's caring for me. In other words, it's given me dignity."
CONCLUSION
Takaful, like many cash transfer programs, deliberately targets women as the primary beneficiaries with the intent to increase women's control over financial resources within the household. However, we found that in Egypt these transfers negatively affect women's control over household decision-making. This is particularly the case for households where the woman had less than primary education. This impact is related to Takaful's negative impact on female labor force participation and to the head of household taking on a role in particular domains of decisionmaking within the household that are generally considered to be women's domains. In parallel, our qualitative data also suggest that the program is still perceived positively by women, particularly due to the targeting of the transfer towards them. They saw this as contributing to their autonomy, adding to their self-esteem, and serving as a form of public recognition of the importance of women's roles towards the care of their children and their household. Both men and women in beneficiary and non-beneficiary households largely expressed support of the program design choice to give the cash to women.
Our findings show that in the Egyptian context targeting cash to poor women is not sufficient to increase women's control over resources. Additional interventions may be necessary to support less educated women. We cannot conclude whether these effects would have been different if the transfers were targeted to men, but it seems unlikely that doing so would have improved women's control over household decisions. Within Egypt, policy-makers have expressed interest in "mainstreaming gender" within the Takaful and Karama programming, as improving women's role in household decision-making is a goal of the program. The complementary interventions suggested include having women attend training sessions or connecting them to decent employment.
Within the broader literature on the impacts of development interventions on intrahousehold decision-making, our results complement the evaluation by Roy et al. (2015) of the targeting the ultra-poor program in Bangladesh. As in their study sample in Bangladesh, our findings show that in rural Egypt the socio-cultural norms for gender dynamics within the household mean that, even with interventions that target women and increase overall household welfare, women can lose voice within the household. This can result from men in a beneficiary household asserting increased control over the expanded household assets and discouraging women from seeking work outside the house. However, we are able to qualify this pessimistic main result with qualitative evidence that shows that women perceive the Takaful program to be empowering and to have positive impacts on intrahousehold relationships. The fact that the impacts of the cash transfer program are processed through social norms of men as decision-makers and income providers is not seen as a negative outcome by the women themselves. What is particularly interesting in our study is that these negative results on decision-making are concentrated among women with less than primary school education, suggesting the potential for expanded education for girls as a way to change the underlying norms driving these dynamics.
